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BOOK REVIEWS
THE INNER EXPERIENCE OF LAW: A JURISPRUDENCE OF
SUBJECTIVITY by David J. K. Granfield, O.S.B.* Washington,

D.C.: The Catholic University Press (1988).
Reviewed by William J. Wagner**

On first perusal, some may suppose that the title of this magnificent new
volume of jurisprudence contains a contradiction in terms. Most litigants,
lawyers, and judges will acknowledge that American legal culture ordinarily
does not consider the law a reality subject to "inner" experience. They know
that when the legal culture refers to jurisprudence at all, it does not, as a
rule, employ a framework that remotely can be termed "subjectivity." The
title of this new work frames the question of law and jurisprudence in these
terms.
Even a casual reading of this work allows the conclusion, however, that
the author contradicts not himself, but only the notion that received attitudes and ideas in contemporary American legal culture are adequate.
David Granfield's work, THE INNER EXPERIENCE OF LAW: A JURISPRUDENCE OF SUBJECTIVITY, challenges readers to reconsider their conception
of law, and it delivers an impressive jurisprudential framework to assist them
in doing so. Granfield's book belongs in every serious collection of American
jurisprudence. Its contribution to the method and theory of law is of significant value for overcoming weaknesses in contemporary jurisprudence, and
in the experience of law in American society.
The purpose of this review will be to introduce the reader to the content of
Granfield's jurisprudence and briefly to explore its implications for legal
thought and practice. THE INNER EXPERIENCE OF LAW: A JURISPRUDENCE OF SUBJECTIVITY is a unified work, but it makes contributions on
four separate levels. These are as follows. The book offers a methodology
which promises a renewed unitary foundation for jurisprudential debate
among rival theories. It propounds a contemporary natural law theory of
Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America.
** Assistant Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of
America.
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jurisprudence. It synthesizes a masterful historical overview of Western jurisprudential thought from the pre-socratics to the contemporary theories of
Robert Nozick and John Rawls. And, it proposes what can be termed a
kind of "spirituality" of law, as a medicine for the existential alienation of
those experiencing law in contemporary society. This review will analyze the
nature and significance of all four of Granfield's contributions.
As a prelude to such analysis, it is helpful to begin by considering more
fully the ordinary American experience of law which appears to exclude the
"innerness" and "subjectivity" that are found in the book's title, and are, as
it will be seen, essential to its concept of law. Granfield makes the same
contrast. He observes that the American legal culture often embodies a focal
definition of law that is based on the individual's experience of legal coercion, as an object fundamentally extrinsic to the world of personal meaning.
Contemporary American jurisprudence usually understands itself, either as
guarantee that the event of legal coercion is predictable or economically efficient,' or as occasion for critically unmasking extrinsic interests which that
event furthers.2 In each case, the meaning of law is measured by extrinsic
uses of power, and tends to be discontinuous with personal moral
experience.
Recent American literature is replete with illustrations of the way persons
experience law from this extrinsicist understanding. An excellent example is
Sherman McCoy, the beleaguered protagonist of Tom Wolfe's telling new
novel about contemporary American society, THE BONFIRE OF THE VANITIES. The protagonist is an irresponsible New York bond trader, who has a
view from the top of the pyramid of status and material possessions. The
character contemplates the prospect of an indictment consequent to a hitand-run accident, as being an essentially absurd assault on his subjective
world and personality. It is interesting to ask how, if at all, his perspective
differs from that of Holmes' "bad man." 4 In many respects, Wolfe depicts a
prototypical contemporary American experience of law.
In Wolfe's novel, the protagonist's attitude towards law causes him con1. Positivism and law and economics, respectively.
2. Legal realism and critical legal studies.
3.

T. WOLFE, THE BONFIRE OF THE VANITIES (1987). This novel also explores the

experience of law from the lawyer's perspective. It raises a number of interesting issues in legal
ethics.
4. Holmes remarked that:
If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who
cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to pre-

dict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or
outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.
Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897).
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siderable subjective suffering and loss. He, of course, is on the receiving end
of legal process and sanction. To learn that many lawyers, who are on the
delivery end of legal process in our society, also suffer from a sense of meaninglessness and absurdity, one need only talk to representative law students,
law firm associates, and even more established lawyers. This existential experience of law as absurd, whether from the perspective of "consumer" or
"producer" of law or legal services, provides a starting point for Granfield's
development of his jurisprudence, within the present book.
By reference to Kafka's novel The Trial,5 Granfield describes what may be
the defendant's perspective on the judicial process. From this vantage, the
judicial process-as in the case of Sherman McCoy-is experienced as a
nightmare offering no apparent possibility of meaningful resolution. With
penetrating insight, Granfield pictures what absurdity looks like from the
other side of the judge's bench. He turns to the thought of Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., probably the leading progenitor of contemporary
American jurisprudential theory and judicial philosophy.6 Granfield shows
that nihilism underlies the Holmesian penchant for generalization. Granfield considers Holmes' nihilism a participation in the same meaninglessness
that Kafka's character experiences as a nightmare of entrapment.
Granfield seeks a jurisprudential basis for understanding and for transforming the contemporary experience of law. In this quest, he for the most
part sets aside recent American jurisprudential schools as points of departure. Positivist heirs of Holmes, like Roscoe Pound, block the way out of the
situation, by adopting a notion of law as "social engineering" and by
manipulating people as though they were objects. Other positivists, like Kelsen and Hart, arbitrarily deny hermeneutical questions about meaning, and,
in that way, also close the door to solving the problem.
The legal realists, including the recent critical legal studies movement, can
also be said to descend from Holmes and are the major alternative to positivism on the contemporary scene. According to Granfield, this second perspective is stronger than that of positivism, to the degree that it
acknowledges the existence of a problem. But, its efforts at a solution are
derailed by ideological reductionism and the lack of adequate theory.
5. F. KAFKA, THE TRIAL (First Engl. Trans. 1937). Granfield relates that Kafka, who
lived from 1883 - 1924, earned a doctor of laws degree and practiced law in Prague, before
going into the insurance business. He was, therefore, personally well acquainted with the character of law, and his work is an apt choice for illustrating Granfield's point.
6. Granfield develops his view of Holmes by reference both to his formal scholarly writing and to his personal correspondence and other communications. Granfield's has an interest
in Holmes primarily as an example of the existential quest for meaning which has been
thwarted by absurdity, rather than as a theorist. The nature of this interest makes the personal
material, including citations from a 90th birthday radio talk in 1931, particularly relevant.
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Granfield does not believe that the revival of comprehensive philosophical
theories of justice, by thinkers like Nozick and Rawls, succeeds any more
than have the jurisprudential schools. Nozick's system suppresses the communal dimension of humanity and conceals the person behind a conceptualization; Rawls' subordinates the ideal of personal insight to a quest for
institutional justifications.
Granfield's response to the impasse of the present situation is an original
jurisprudence resting on the central insight that, whatever else may be the
case with law, the law's appropriation, as subjectively meaningful, is a fundamental imperative. This recognition resonates with the deeper longings of
every attorney starting practice. Granfield's project answers an existential
need of the American lawyer. To explore the nature of Granfield's answer, it
is most helpful to consider, separately in turn, its content on each of its
several levels. Once its content in each area is in view, the broader implications of Granfield's book for the theory and practice of law in American
society can be assessed.
I.

GRANFIELD'S PROPOSAL OF A UNITARY METHODOLOGY

Because of contemporary jurisprudence's fragmented condition, general
discussion cannot expect to commence with shared theoretical principles.
As many have acknowledged, the meaningful discussion of jurisprudential
proposals threatens to break down completely. Granfield's response, like
that of Ronald Dworkin in his recent tome, Law's Empire,7 is to suggest that
methodological agreement can provide needed common ground, even while
thoroughgoing theoretical differences remain. At its most basic, Granfield's
jurisprudential proposal is a methodological one. He suggests an openended set of conditions, which must be satisfied if any theory, his own included, is to be considered sound. He proposes that agreement on the relevance of these conditions can unite the discussion among theories as
disparate as those held by "Positivists, Pragmatists, Naturalists, Idealists,
Utilitarians and Existentialists."
Granfield's reasons for granting a paramount role to methodology are
deeper than just pragmatic concern with contemporary theoretical fragmentation. For Granfield, how one thinks has a certain conceptual priority over
what one thinks. Granfield gives a theoretical, as well as pragmatic justification for the primacy of method. His method and its justification are largely
derived from Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984), a Canadian Jesuit theologian
and philosopher. Granfield's reliance on Bernard Lonergan parallels Dworkin's reliance on Hans Georg Gadamer.
7. R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 45 (1986).
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Positing method as a ground which can unify theory and theoretical debate is common to Gadamer and Lonergan. As an option, it can be related
to larger patterns in contemporary philosophy. Lonergan's thought represents the option as it has been taken within the context of twentieth-century
Catholic theological speculation. Lonergan's particular brand of Catholic
theology is known as transcendental Thomism. The movement emerged in
the 1920's, following the insight of Joseph Mar~chal, a Belgian Jesuit, that
the Kantian "turn towards the subject" could provide a foundation for a
modern reappropriation of inherited Catholic notions about God, reason,
and nature, and for the reaffirmation of a kind of rational knowledge about
God. Bernard Lonergan, a leading exponent of the movement, made his special study the a prioristructures of human knowing and deciding. In works
such as INSIGHT, and METHOD IN THEOLOGY, Lonergan made his methodological proposal, advancing what he termed a "transcendental method." 8
Lonergan's method has profoundly influenced Roman Catholic theology,
and it has had a creative impact in a number of other disciplines. 9 In the
present work, David Granfield is the first to apply the transcendental
method to the task of reconstituting legal theory and jurisprudence. If
Dworkin's recent application of hermeneutical method in Law's Empire is an
indication of general inclination, theorists should be receptive to Granfield's
use of Lonergan, and Granfield's choice can be expected to have a seminal
effect. To grasp Granfield's application of the transcendental method, it is
best to first consider the method and, then, to address Granfield's specification of the method for application within jurisprudence.
The transcendental method postulates that the mind reasons in a way
which is universally the same, regardless of individual theoretical commitments. By reflecting on the sequence of operations universal to rational
thought, the mind can critically articulate standards of cogency for theoretical reasoning. According to Granfield/Longergan, introspection confirms
that sound reasoning always proceeds in the following ordered sequence of
steps: awareness or experience of the data; understanding of intelligible patterns in the data (the insight or hypothesis); judgment of the truth of intelligible patterns (verification of the insight or hypothesis); and decision about
the implications of the verified insight or hypothesis for values.
While these steps of reasoning can be consciously separated, Granfield/
Lonergan see them as moments in a single unitary drive or tendency in
human consciousness towards unrestricted knowledge and value. Insofar as
8. B. LONERGAN, INSIGHT (1957); B. LONERGAN,
1972).
9. See generally D. TRACY, THE ACHIEVEMENT OF

METHOD IN THEOLOGY
BERNARD LONERGAN

(2d Ed.

(1970).
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one knows, understands, and judges what is true, one moves towards an
innate goal of unrestricted consciousness or "interiority." Insofar as one intends the good through decisions for value, one tends towards one's goal of
unrestricted self-consciousness or "authenticity." Both kinds of goals are
constitutive of human awareness. In order to make our pursuit of consciousness and self-consciousness (or interiority and authenticity) rational, we need
only, critically, to subject the data of our own knowing and deciding to the
operations of experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding.
The transcendental method is intended as nothing other than systematically rational and critical consciousness and self-consciousness. The method
employs precepts derived by introspection from the four stages of reasoning:
experiencing, understanding, judging, deciding. These precepts can be
stated as: Be attentive! Be intelligent! Be reasonable! And, be Responsible!
For critical consciousness and self-consciousness, the data becomes, simultaneously, the data of the objective world and the data of subjective awareness
of self in relation to objective circumstances. The transcendental precepts,
which guide inquiry and decision with regard to both kinds of data, derive
from a tendency implicit in the subject and their telos is subjective fulfillment. At the same time, they orient the subject to the objective world.
In evaluating any theory, the transcendental method requires that the theory account for how well it explains and facilitates experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding. Adequacy on one or another level is not enough;
theory may be invalidated for failing on just one plane. For instance, a theory, which functions well in purporting to explain an aspect of the objective
situation, may be faulted for failing to guide authentic personal decision
about values, when decision is called for by the verification of some factual
hypothesis.
As Granfield develops the method for application to jurisprudence, he emphasizes the overarching normative importance of critical interiority and authenticity. Whatever virtues a theory has for attending to data, generating
hypotheses, verifying hypotheses, and furthering decisions, it is methodologically unsound, if it cannot establish, in the larger picture, that it rationally
furthers one's subjective interiority and authenticity. In an excellent section
of his book called "The Interior Markings," Granfield moves well beyond
Lonergan, developing support for this view from the writings of Kierkegaard, Newman, and Ortega y Gasset.' ° He uses these methodological
norms for a critique of the contemporary theories of Rawls and Nozick.
10. In this section, Granfield works primarily from the following sources: S. KIERKEGAARD, CONCLUDING SCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT (1846); J. NEWMAN, GRAMMAR OF ASSENT
(1870); J. ORTEGA YGASSET, Verdad y Perspectiva, in EL SPECTADOR 1 (1916); J. OTEGA Y

GASSET, OBRAS COMPLETAS (1957 - 58).
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For the sake of applying the transcendental method, as I have just described it, to jurisprudence, Granfield gives the method further original specification. Within the discipline of jurisprudence, data is generated by the
given array of kinds of relationships which constitute subjective horizons of
relevant meaning: relationship with self, with another subject, with the
political community, and with the ground of existence. The application of
the transcendental method to jurisprudence, then, is a matter of experiencing, understanding and judging the significance of, and making authentic
decisions concerning, data flowing from each of these relationships. The
specification of the transcendental method to track these fundamental given
relationships is reflected in the division of Granfield's book into sections on
the monosphere (reflexive relationship), isosphere (intersubjective relation-'
ship), koinosphere (political relationship), and theosphere (ultimate relationship with meaning).
Within each sphere, Granfield develops this theoretical contribution to jurisprudence, attending to the requirements of the transcendental precepts.
Given the focus of law on personal and communal decision, the matter of
Granfield's investigation within all spheres tends to be authenticity. His critical theory of law is developed through systematic investigation of the requirements of experiencing, understanding, and judging about personal and
communal decisions, and decisions about how such decisions generally
should be made.
II.

GRANFIELD'S THEORY OF JURISPRUDENCE

The interplay between method and theory in Granfield's work is subtle,
and the separation of his methodological from his theoretical insights may
require, at points, some arbitrary choice. Philosophical theory is, in Granfield and among transcendental Thomists generally, often conceived as the
"thematization" of implicit data of consciousness. Since the methodological
precepts being employed by these thinkers are themselves data of consciousness, it is not always possible or desirable to draw a clear line between propositions being advanced as methodological axioms and propositions
substantively intended as theory. This is especially the case where the author's stated purpose, as here, is to reduce rather than to heighten polarities
within the jurisprudential debate. Nonetheless, the rich content of Granfield's thought, as it coheres theoretically, can and should be considered
aside from its methodological underpinnings.
In sharp contrast to positivists who discover the concept of law in society's extrinsic control over behavior manifested in the phenomenal world,
Granfield's theory posits that the paradigmatic meaning of law is discovered
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in the monosphere of reflexive self-awareness. He illustrates this claim with
the assistance of terms borrowed from Greek philosophy and myth, most
notably from Plato.1 As a primitive fact of consciousness, Granfield asserts
that subjects discover that they are constituted as such by a drive towards
unlimited fulfillment through reality, described by the Greeks as eros. Subjects make the virtually simultaneous discovery that when eros propels them
into actions out of conformity with the requirements of reality, they suffer
what seems to be a kind of karmic retribution, termed by the Greeks
nemesis.
From the experience of nemesis, the individual learns to distinguish flawed
from right action. For Granfield, this experience is the primitive experience
of law. The right use of freedom leads to authentic self-fulfillment; the
wrong use of freedom to reality's "revenge." Granfield uses this thematization, of what he says is universal subjective experience, to ground his theory
of law in all spheres, including those he terms the isosphere, koinosphere, and
theosphere. This primary definitional referent distinguishes Granfield's approach to law from that of the positivists. It also distinguishes his approach
to the meaning of freedom, from that of a thinker such as John Rawls. The
difference between Granfield and Rawls corresponds roughly to the distinction between authenticity and autonomy, as primary ideals.
Granfield's paradigmatic meaning of law is, in a fundamental sense, in
continuity with the natural law tradition of St. Thomas. For both St.
Thomas and Granfield, law and morality are integrally related to one another. In both thinkers, law and morality receive their content through the
use of recta ratio or right reason. 2 The use of reason in the two thinkers
differs to the extent that Granfield critically employs the transcendental
method. In Granfield, reason no longer is grounded in the objective requirements of nature, as it is in St. Thomas, but, rather, is grounded in the "objective" requirements of subjective authenticity. To this same extent,
Granfield's continuity with St. Thomas, although fundamental, has undergone a certain revision.
As a complement to his notion of law, Granfield delineates a theory of
justice. Unlike his notion of law, Granfield's theory of justice is not developed within the monosphere of reflexive self-awareness, but is developed instead within the sphere of the subject's relationship with others, a sphere
Granfield terms the Isosphere. He develops his theory of justice as a thematization of the data of intersubjectivity. He does so with the assistance of
concepts taken from Aristotle (384 - 322 B.C.) and Giorgio Del Vecchio
11. Granfield relies primarily on the Symposium and the Laws.
12. See T. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, I-II, 90-94.
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(1878 - 1970).13 Del Vecchio was an Italian legal philosopher.
The subject's encounter with other "selves" is a primary datum of human
consciousness. The intersubjective encounter brings with it a simultaneous
discovery that the subject's own sense of authenticity depends on acknowledging other subjects as subjects. The dynamic of intersubjectivity necessarily has the character of conflict among claims, however, because each subject
is constituted as such, by an unrestricted drive towards self-fulfillment. Authentic decisions in the intersubjective realm require that one acknowledge
one's own claims and the claims of other subjects, as morally equal. But,
how can claims be equalized, which are, in one important sense, incommensurate, since each claim reflects an unrestricted and separate subjectivity?
Commensuration of one's claims with those of other subjects, for the sake
of subjectively appropriating their public or private resolution, is made possible by giving an independent value tojustice, defined as reciprocal recognition of the equality of persons. In addition to valuing participation in the
good at stake in the underlying dispute, authentic subjects also value justice,
which Granfield calls "selves treating one another as selves." For the sake of
justice, two subjects can autonomously accept a commensuration of claims
in conflict, without diminution of their subjective dignity. The goal of justice, for Granfield, is not as much an "objective" commutation of claims, as
rather the subjective appropriation of a judgment by the two parties to a
conflict, in a way furthering their reciprocal movement towards authenticity.
In this vision, justice becomes almost an aesthetic ideal, akin to the harmony
and balance characteristic of dance.
Granfield's anthropology recognizes a certain innate tendency of persons
to claim more than their just share of advantages and less than their just
share of disadvantages. With Aristotle, Granfield terms this tendency pleonexia. From the perspective of individual subjectivity, this tendency represents an entropic tendency at odds with authentic fulfillment. From the
perspective of communal order, this is a tendency, which requires the justification of mechanisms of enforcement.
In order to elaborate a theory legitimating the use of legal force in furtherance of justice, Granfield shifts the discussion from the data of the isosphere
to that of third sphere, the sphere of participation in the political enterprise.
He names this the koinosphere. Like the positivists, Granfield stresses the
importance for society of a structured framework of offices and roles for
administering and maintaining the rule of law. But, unlike them, Granfield
13. Granfield relies mainly on

ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS; ARISTOTLE, POLI-

TICS; DEL VECCHIO, JUSTICE: AN HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY

1956).

(Engi. trans.
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insists that the positive power of law and legal process has not been validated, until it is shown how these can be appropriated subjectively as
meaningful.
For Granfield, the force of law can, in fact, be grounded in two key subjective values. These are love, in the form of politicalfriendship, and knowledge, in the form of political communion in an idea. Whereas positivists
must rely on ancillary extrinsic social pressure to explain compliance with
law,14 Granfield posits inner acceptance of legal obligation, as subjectively
meaningful. True legal duty, subject to such subjective appropriation, is imposed by power that conforms to the expectations of the people and the dictates of reason. So conformed, power has the character of authority.
Granfield posits that the subject discovers meaning not only in relation to
self, the other, and the community, but in relation also to the whole. Granfield terms this relation the theosphere. In this sphere, the subject grapples
with rationality itself, apart from its particular applications. It is against this
horizon, that Granfield elaborates the possibility of thematizing primary analytic and specifying secondary synthetic principles of moral reasoning.
These principles are theoretical, although they rest on the postulates of the
transcendental method. Their theoretical content provide a basis for normative judgments about the morality of human actions.
In keeping with his decision in the present work to pursue primarily methodological rather than theoretical questions, Granfield devotes his attention
to the cognitional process of appropriating and applying such norms under
the circumstances of existence, rather than to developing his own extended
statement of their theoretical content. On one level, he explores the practical
reasoning necessary to decide the scope of the norm's application. Here he
inquires into the meaning of interpretation, dispensation, and epikeia. On a
second level, he provides the cognitional theory necessary to understand the
subject's application of norms in concrete cases and explores the meaning of
deliberation, evaluation, and decision, as stages in practical reasoning.
This section of Granfield's book provides a helpful survey of late-twentieth century natural law theory. There can be no question that Granfield's
theory places him in the natural law tradition. In this section, the reader
learns to distinguish the characteristics of contemporary natural law approaches, including Granfield's, from the pre-modern and scholastic approaches of another era. Conservative revisions, such as that of John Finnis,
are analyzed;15 as also are less fettered revisions, such as Josef Fuchs' and
14. See H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79 (1961).
15. Granfield cites J. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL
FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS (1983).

RIGHTS

(1980); J.

FINNIS,

1988]

Book Reviews

Richard McCormick's. 16
Granfield also introduces the reader to the proportionalist controversy
which has, in recent years, rent Roman Catholic ethics. He understands the
split between proportionalists and their opponents, as the result of a divided
Catholic response to a "paradigm shift" 1" in contemporary culture from
"classical" to "empirical" consciousness. Although Granfield refrains from
conclusive judgment on the ultimate cogency of the proportionalist-revisionist response, he notes that, in respects, it mirrors the direction of Lonergan's
transcendental method.
As a controversy within Catholicism, proportionalism cannot be evaluated without reference to its treatment of faith and the authority of Scripture
and the Magisterium, issues which Granfield rightly considers beyond the
scope of the present work. Within the scope of the discussion as he frames it,
however, the author may give an overly irenic interpretation to the "revisionist" position. In the work of the authors he cites, "proportionate reason," as a mode of reasoning, may actually have less content and may have
less continuity in its conclusions with the natural law tradition, than Granfield's own statement of the hypothetical "moderate revisionist" position
fully indicates. Granfield wishes to highlight the features which keep these
theories within the natural law framework. Others see them as closer to
utilitarianism or emotivism.
The phenomenon of proportionalism illustrates a danger of the misdirection which can flow from the application of transcendental Thomism to ethics. Transcendental Thomism's stress on the subjective may lead to gnostic
"self-creation" as an ideal, rather than to authenticity won through respect
for reality both transcending the subject and constituting it in relation to
objective circumstances. In order to make fruitful use of the transcendental
method, while avoiding this false direction, natural law theory must give
adequate theoretical content to the difference between right and flawed action, posited by Granfield as the primitive experience of law. "Proportionate
reason," as it is defined by the proportionalists, does not seem to be an adequate explanation of this difference, either in its account of the requirements
of reality or in its account of the practical wisdom needed to make responsive decisions. As Granfield describes them, the self-evident goods of John
Finnis, a natural law theorist critical of proportionalism, appear to be the
more satisfactory explanation.
16. Granfield cites R. MCCORMICK,

NOTES ON MORAL THEOLOGY

1965

THROUGH

1980

(1980); R. MCCORMICK, NOTES ON MORAL THEOLOGY 1981 THROUGH 1984 (1984); DOING
EVIL TO ACHIEVE GOOD (R. McCormick ed. 1978).
17. Granfield refers to the well-known concept developed by Thomas Kuhn. See T.
KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962).
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Granfield moves from a general inquiry into rationality and the theoretical
principles that can be grounded in it, to the more specific question of God.
He notes that modernity, beginning with Grotius' "impious hypothesis," has
tended to exclude God from jurisprudence.1 8 Still, Granfield posits that the
subject's "noetic" or "hermeneutic" experience is, at ground, an experience
of God as the ultimate horizon of meaning, value, and existence. The experience of law, too, when taken to the depth dimension includes an encounter
with God understood in this sense. Granfield proposes reciprocally that one
can learn about law by thinking about God and that one can learn about
God by thinking about the experience of law.
Granfield traces the reference to the divine found in jurisprudence, from
the time of the pre-Socratics to the beginning of the modern era. In agreement with Voegelin, 19 he sees a deformative tendency beginning with the
Stoics and accompanying the tradition, which tends to "split the symbol"
from the noetic experience of insight which underlies it. This deformative
tendency accounts for some undue formalism and rigidity found in the natural law tradition. His own theological referent is intended as a retrieval of
the subjective noetic experience. In a modern context, this places Granfield
with Gadamer and Lonergan in calling for an attitude of unrestricted openness to the possibility of meaning. Granfield names Sartrean atheism as the
antithesis of this desired attitude.
III.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF WESTERN JURISPRUDENCE

Quite in addition to its significant contributions on the level of theory and
method, this volume is an invaluable reference work. THE INNER EXPERIENCE OF LAW: A JURISPRUDENCE OF SUBJECTIVITY contains several extended historical sections, introducing the reader to the decisive figures,
schools, ideas, and themes in the history of jurisprudence. Among the many
virtues in Granfield's historical treatment, one would wish to mention his
effortless and graceful style and erudition, his'comprehensiveness, and his
extraordinary economy. Although serving a somewhat different and more
specialized goal, Granfield's historical discussion easily compares in quality
to the historical sections of the first part of Alisdair McIntyre's After
Virtue.2 °
With relative brevity, Granfield covers enormous ground. He manages
18. The so-called "impious hypothesis" is that "[e]ven if we concede that which cannot be
conceded without the utmost wickedness, that there is no God or that the affairs of men are of
no concern to him" the natural law retains its validity (as quoted by Granfield). H. GROTIUS,
DE JURI BELLI Ac PACIS PROLOGOMENA (1646).

19. Granfield cites E. VOEGELIN, 4 ORDER AND HISTORY:
20. A. MCINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (2d ed. 1984).

THE ECUMENIC AGE

(1974).
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this deed by describing truly salient ideas with simple elegance, and by placing ideas in clear relationship to their antecedents. Granfield explains more
in a sentence, than Carl Friedrich often does in several paragraphs of THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN' HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE.2 1 His book will be
useful to readers desiring succinct, understandable, and reliable descriptions
of the elements of an intellectual history of jurisprudence. It gives deft and
reliable guidance about past thinkers more or less closely related to jurisprudence, from Heraclitus to Wittgenstein. It does the same with respect to
contemporary theorists, such as Hart, Unger, Nozick, Rawls, Finnis and
McDougal.
The book provides enlightenment about the particular positions associated
with jurisprudential schools such as the Historical School, Positivism, Natural Law, Legal Realism, and Critical Legal Studies. It gives substantial
assistance in mapping the treatment which individual thinkers and schools
have given to basic themes, whether the fact/value problem, the meaning of
power and authority, the nature of rights, the issue of justice, or the relationship of law to morality.
Although Granfield's book, as a whole, gives a fairly continuous survey of
jurisprudence from antiquity to the present, he does not describe this history
in a unilinear or chronological fashion, which is an advantage for meaningful
assimilation by the reader. Granfield marshals his historical material in several different segments. In each case, he does so as background for understanding themes and problems in contemporary jurisprudence. Granfield
asks questions of the ancients and modems alike, which the reader finds
meaningful. Granfield has a refreshingly light touch which brings his historical narrative to life.
One reason Granfield's history comes to life is that it is geschichtlich; it
tells a story. The story that Granfield's historical account tells is how the
contemporary extrinsicist pass, described above, was reached. In approaching this question, Granfield chooses a narrower canvas (strictly the jurisprudential problem) and, one might add, a more scholarly approach, than did
Allan Bloom in a similar inquiry into modernity in the recent popular work,
THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 22, although clearly there is a relationship between the separate problems which concern Bloom and Granfield. One of several important substantive differences between Granfield and
Bloom is that Granfield sees opportunities, as well as losses, in the philosophical developments underlying later modernity.
21.

C. FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2d ed.

1963).

22. A.

BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND

(1987).
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Granfield begins his historical narrative not at the beginning, but in medias res, with the Cartesian turn in the seventeenth century. He traces the
consequences of this development forward into our own time, and he also
translates the pre-Cartesian history of jurisprudence into terms modern
readers can more clearly assimilate, by reading it through the frame of the
transcendental method. As a result, the reader easily absorbs and accurately
retains a grasp of intellectual history which would otherwise remain, for
many, nearly opaque. Granfield is exceptionally sensitive to the specific differences of the various philosophical approaches to be found in the history of
jurisprudence. He can be so because the unity of his own focus, aims, and
method allow him to coordinate with ease the whole of the narrative.
Granfield traces the genesis of the extrinsicist impasse to certain philosophical options taken in the wake of the Cartesian turn. Cartesian rationalism and the jurisprudence inspired by it were impoverished by a loss of
continuity with the categories of pre-modern natural law reasoning. The
empiricism of Hume, Hobbes and Locke introduced an anti-metaphysical
bias to thinking about law. After Kant's "copernican revolution" shifted
the quest for epistemological certainty from objective nature to the subjective a priori,Cartesian rationalism had lost its foundations. Empiricism then
tended to prevail, and with it the assumption that reason's proper focus is
fact not value.
In jurisprudence, one response was the historical school of Friedrich Carl
von Savigny, which focused empirically on what the law was, within a cultural tradition. Another was the positivism of Auguste Comte, which focused on what the law is, as an instrument of social control. In England,
where it is known as the analytical school, positivism has had an ascendency,
dating to John Austin's early nineteenth century jurisprudence. H.L.A. Hart
is a contemporary exponent. In America, positivism has also had a strong
influence, through the influence of such thinkers as Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr. and Roscoe Pound. In its more pragmatic form, it engendered legal
realism.
By separating the fact of law from value and by severing the realm of
subjective meaning from that of objective social control of behavior, positivism in its various forms has, Granfield believes, led to the present unsatisfactory situation. Together with larger correlated elements in modern
philosophical history, it has led to a diminished subject, nihilism, and irreducible pluralism. Granfield's narrative study of recent jurisprudential history by no means, however, sees only harm flowing from modernity. He
considers that modernity contains, as it were, the opportunity for its own
"redemption." The subject/object problem, which gave rise to the harms of
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positivism, provides the possibility of the new foundation and normative direction represented by the transcendental method.
Granfield suggests that a number of patterns in the post-Kantian intellectual history of jurisprudence provide support for the direction he proposes.
Generally, he sees the German idealism of, say, Hegel, as supportive of his
proposal, as also the existentialism of a Soren Kierkegaard or Martin Buber.
Granfield sees attractive features in the Neo-Kantianism of Rudolph Stammler and the Neo-Hegelianism of Josef Kohler. In the more recent and specifically American past, he gravitates to the natural law approaches of Lon
Fuller and John Noonan.
Within a modem framework, recommitted to value, Granfield is able to
undertake a renewed appropriation of the pre-modem and Eastern history of
jurisprudence. Thus, he is able to draw effectively and persuasively on the
historical contributions of Aristotle, Plato, and even the Bhagvad Gita.
IV.

GRANFIELD'S "SPIRITUALITY"

OF LAW

David Granfield's book concludes with a chapter entitled "The Vision of
Law." In this final chapter, the author elaborates on the meaning of his
jurisprudence as "an inner experience of law." This is experience of "the
tension, whereby free actions guided by law can lead to the paradoxical goal
of self-fulfillment through self-transcendence." Granfield both gives content
to the idea of "self-transcending self-fulfillment" and adumbrates the existential process through which the law contributes to reaching this condition,
named by Granfield authenticity.
In many respects, Granfield's concluding chapter will remind the reader
of the writings of Aristotle and St. Thomas, on the nature and source of a
virtuous character. 23 Where St. Thomas' treatment of virtue may seem remote to some modem readers, Granfield's ideal has an immediate appeal,
and will inspire many. Clearly, Granfield's book will be read and studied by
academics, but it should also be read by practicing lawyers and judges, for
Granfield gives an answer to the perennial question, "How can I be a good
lawyer and at the same time a good human being?" Granfield offers his ideal
not as an abstraction, but as an existential goal presented with guidance on
how it may gradually be attained. By putting into practice what the author
proposes, the lawyer can hope not just to admire, but actually to become the
ideal. It seems appropriate to refer to Granfield's contribution on this level,
as a "spirituality" of law.
One of the overarching normative values of Granfield's method and the23. ARISTOTLE,
II-I, 1-170.

NICOMACHEAN ETHICS;

T. AQUINAS,

SUMMA THEOLOGIAE

I-I, 55-70;
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ory is, it will be recalled, authenticity, or a character shaped by right to
decisions. More specifically, Granfield envisions this character as open to
meaning and value, committed to meaning and value, unified by its awareness of meaning and value, and, luminous because transparent to transcendent meaning and value.
Granfield suggests that each of these virtues can be attained through participation in the meaning and value of law and the legal process. The most
basic kind of participation is, he proposes, in the conforming of our actions
to our knowledge. This often means changing actions to benefit from the
knowledge that flows from mistakes. A second mode of participation is
through an appropriate attitude towards the law, depending on our role in a
given conflict. The appropriate attitude will vary, for example, depending on
whether we are transgressors or victims. A third mode of participation is in
the adjustment of attitude and action depending on the sphere. For instance,
law in the sphere of positive or civil law is a different matter than in the
sphere of personal morality. In the sphere of the positive law, the koinosphere, law should be understood as action about actions which involve relationships that give rise to obligations. Litigants should not, then, view
themselves as spectators, but rather as participants in these actions. A
fourth mode of participation is through self-consciousness in all modes and
at all levels of one's participation in law. Such self-consciousness entails the
experience of the particular legal event as "a conscious event experienced in
a continuum of authentic decisions." This is the experience of what Granfield terms interiority. Ultimately, interiority attained through participation
in law can be an experience of transcendence.
Granfield offers his ideal vision of growth in authenticity and interiority
through law, especially:
to those in the legal profession who have a special stake in the
successful resoltuion of this human problem. Judges, lawyers,
professors, and even law students develop a characteristic mentality. Law transforms them for better or worse. If it remains simply
a job, a prestigious way of making a living, a sophisticated, dialectical skill, or a springboard to a position of power and influence, it
splits their life into uncoordinated personal and professional compartments. The result is that one may become worldly wise without being truly wise.
Legal educators will welcome the contribution to the humanistic formation
of young lawyers represented by THE INNER EXPERIENCE OF LAW: A JuRISPRUDENCE OF SUBJECTIVITY. This book has the potential for changing
lives and transforming careers. It belongs not just in the law school jurispru-
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dence curriculum, but also in the law school course on professional
responsibility.
V.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF GRANFIELD'S WORK FOR THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF LAW IN AMERICAN SOCIETY

Granfield's substantial and multivalent contributions to jurisprudence
have clear implications for the theory and practice of law in American society. With respect to theory, Granfield's generic principles and axioms have
implications for nearly every legal specialty. Granfield himself finds an opportunity in the course of the volume to apply his general theoretical and
methodological framework to the solution of problems in one of his own
specialties, criminal law. Because Granfield's jurisprudence pioneers a new
methodology, the possibilities of its application to specific problems in various legal specialties are enormously promising. One area which Granfield's
theory of justice could fruitfully address is the reform of the adversarial system. In this area, his framework also has special relevance to both procedural and remedial questions. It also has implications for law and medicine,
both with respect to the doctrine of informed consent and the just resolution
of conflicting claims to scarce medical resources.
At the present, considerable controversy exists between the proponents of
critical legal studies and the faculty majorities, at more than one major
American law school.24 Granfield's method and theory can be of immediate
assistance in adding to the light and reducing the heat of this disagreement.
As the discussion in this review has shown, Granfield's proposals tend to
recognize and embody values promoted by both sides of the battle. They
may represent a common ground that will have a constructive effect on repairing the rift. Granfield's subjective/transcendental method is intended to
unify just such theoretically fragmented debate-As Granfield states in his
introduction, "Theories separate; subjectivities unite."
On the level of practice, Granfield's jurisprudence also has significant implications. The transformation which Granfield's jurisprudence would work
in lawyers and others who participate in law and legal process would be
dramatic, to say the least, if they were to follow its lead. The net result
would be a legal system more clearly in the service of authentic individuals
striving to form more genuine communities, both among lawyers and in society as a whole.
24. The character of the dispute is evident in the exchange that began with the publication
of Paul D. Carrington's Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222 (1984). This correspondence was printed in the Journal of Legal Education. 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1985).
Harvard Law School is the center of the most publicized CLS-engendered faculty split. Trillin, A Reporter at Large: Harvard Law, THE NEW YORKER, March 26, 1984, at 53.
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This very fine volume of jurisprudence has implications for all who participate in the theory or practice of law. It should be read by everyone. In a
refreshing way, this book is itself a convincing illustration of the ideal its
author proposes, since it is "open," "committed," "unified," and, indeed,
even "luminous." In order to understand what the author means by "authenticity" and "interiority," attend not just to what this books says, but to
the beauty and humanity with which the author says it.
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In LAW, BEHAVIOR, AND MENTAL HEALTH: POLICY AND PRACTICE,
Professors Smith and Meyer have managed to paint a very broad canvas
with a very fine brush. Their book is no slapdash survey of a few timely
topics. It is a meticulously researched and documented analysis of a very
large and comprehensive field, a reference work well worth having in one's
library.
Smith and Meyer get a handle on their broad and somewhat unwieldy
topic by dividing it into three parts: (1) the law and mental health practice
(2) human behavior and the courtroom, and (3) behavioral science and social-legal policy. A fourth part in the form of a brief conclusionary analysis
of the themes in law and the behavioral sciences is added.
The first part, examining the law and mental health practice, is necessarily
somewhat ranging. But the subtitle of the book holds it together: it deals
with the practical as well as the policy aspects of the interactions between
the law and the mental health profession and the concerns of both. The
practical issues dealt with involve licensing and regulation of the mental
health care delivery systems, and the authors delve deeply into professional
ethics, confidentiality, privilege, privacy, as well as malpractice liability. The
policy issues taken up in part one include the legal issues involved in psycho* A.B., J.D., M.L.S. Professor of Law, Catholic University of America.

